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Introduction and Research Questions
Today, good care for patients at the end-of-life (EoL) is often evaluated
according to the principles of palliative care (WHO, 2006). One of the
predominant ideas is to involve the relatives in the process of care and
decision-making and to accept them as part of the “unit of care.”1 As
members of the unit of care, relatives should enjoy paramount significance
(Reiter-Theil, 2003). Whereas this seems to be evident for parents of
pediatric patients despite many difficulties, especially with severely ill
infants (Hentschel, Linder, & Krüger, 2006), it needs to be emphasized for
the loved ones of adult patients. The involvement of relatives is not only
relevant for the clinical and psychological quality of care; the way relatives
are involved in EoL care and in making treatment decisions also has
normative impact. Legal regulations and ethical guidelines set national
standards of when and how relatives should receive information and
participate in making treatment decisions. Also, the question of a moral right
of relatives to be involved in decision-making will be discussed (Arnold and
Kellum, 2003).
It has often been said that Europe is maintaining a stronger paternalism as
compared to the U.S. focus on patient autonomy (Giannini, Pessina, &
Tacchi, 2003; Levy, 2001; Gerlach, Dhainut, & Harbarth et al., 2003;
Eidelmann and Jakobsen, 1998; Reich and Jecker, 1995; Reiter-Theil, 1998;
Zientek, 2005). This was also concluded by Fassier et al. (Fassier, Lautrette,
& Ciroldi et al., 2005) in their review of empirical studies on the European
situation.2 This issue is connected with the vision of the relatives’ roles in
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cases where the patient is unable to express himself: the more
paternalistically clinical decision-making is organized by the staff, the less
the family of the patient will be invited and able to give their opinions on the
patient’s wishes. Insofar as respect for the patient’s perspective and wishes is
followed as a guiding principle in practice, the observations and
considerations of relatives will be significant for understanding what an
unconscious or incapacitated patient might wish.
Swiss federal law states that informed consent is a prerequisite for
treatment. However, it is less accurately regulated what procedure should be
carried out if the patient is incapacitated. Presently, a gray zone of pragmatic
tolerance leaves space for physicians to decide on their own or to influence
whether a substitute decision-maker will be formally appointed by a court, or
whether an informal approach of decision-making on the grounds of medical
indication and best interest standards will be utilized. In situations where
neither a valid patient wish can be obtained, nor an advance directive or an
authorized substitute decision-maker are available, the treatment decision
remains with the physician in charge. In the case of patients unable to give
informed consent, the physician should, according to national ethics
guidelines (SAMS, 2005; SAMS, 2004; Bartels, Parker, & Hope et al.,
2005), act on the patient’s “presumed wishes” when making any treatment
decision. The proposed course of action should be in agreement with the
presumed patient wishes. Relatives will be the central source of information
to gain better insight into the situation. Even though the criterion of the
patient’s “presumed wishes” is a soft one and not clearly defined by the
guidelines, there seems to be consensus among Swiss clinicians and the
population that the relatives of the patient should be involved in determining
the “presumed wishes”.
This viewpoint is reflected in the draft of the revision of the Civil Code3
that has been initiated to give patients’ rights, advance directives, and
authorized substitute decision-makers a stronger position, in addition to
strengthening the role of the relatives. Legally, relatives of adult,
unconscious, sedated, or demented patients do not have a “right” to make
treatment decisions for the patient unless they have been authorized to act as
a substitute in advance by the patient or in an acute case by the court.
Officially, it is considered incorrect, we may call it a normative error, for
clinicians to ask the family: “What do you prefer regarding the treatment of
your family member?” The “normative error” is even more severe in EoL
care and decisions on life-sustaining measures. However, this kind of
approach does occur as personal communications and observations have
shown. Furthermore, the issue of confidentiality is related to this topic.
Legally, clinicians should give information to relatives only with the
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patient’s permission. Yet in end-of-life care, advance directives or
authorizations of substitute decision-makers are not only frequently
unavailable, but in most cases, staff cannot rely on any permission to waive
confidentiality. The general expectation of relatives to be involved is based
on assumptions that are incompatible with the premises of the present legal
situation in Switzerland. However, some of the ethics guidelines (SAMS,
2004) as well as the planned revision of the Civil Code point in the direction
of lowering the threshold to involve and to inform relatives as “significant
others”. Although confidentiality is an important issue to clarify, in our study
we focused on the role of relatives in clinical decision-making because this
has even greater practical relevance and needs stronger justification than the
sharing of information. The study refers to case deliberation in a clinical unit
that engages in ongoing efforts to implement procedural rules of ethical
decision-making. We had the opportunity to carry out a mixed research
strategy to yield clinically authentic observations and data. Data was
analyzed descriptively and discussed ethically regarding four questions:
1. What are the most important ethical and practical issues in situations
where relatives are, or should be, involved in EoL decision-making
(Reiter-Theil, 2003)?
2. What kind of “authority” do or should relatives have in these situations?
3. How does, or should, the clinical team handle the identified challenges
(Hurst, Perrier, & Reiter-Theil et al., 2006)?
4. What kind of support can we suggest for clinical teams to cope with the
challenges (Reiter-Theil, 2004)?
Methods and Approaches
The paper uses three empirical samples. First, an overview of a systematic
case-series of ten patients treated in a surgical intensive care unit, which is a
sub-sample of a larger set of case series. Second, one selected case study,
and third, the analysis of selected quotes from the discussion of this case
using verbatim transcripts. The results reflecting the relatives’ involvement
in EoL treatment decision-making were gained from these sources and
submitted to ethical analysis. The method of case documentation followed
the concept of the “Embedded Researcher” (Reiter-Theil, 2004) and was
developed as an innovative approach to gather clinically authentic and
ethically relevant data in a standardized way providing valid insight into the
EoL decision-making process (Meyer-Zehnder, Pargger, & Reiter-Theil,
2007). The systematic series of ten randomly selected cases was documented
on a surgical intensive care unit in Switzerland. The only criterion of
inclusion was that the care team, at some point during the course of illness
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considered withholding or withdrawing a treatment. An ethical case analysis
using the “Embedded Researcher” approach has been published (Bühler and
Reiter-Theil, 2004).
To collect medically as well as ethically relevant information, a
documentation questionnaire consisting of three parts was developed. The
observer’s (Embedded Researcher’s) subjective assessment and freedom of
interpretation was minimized using a systematic procedure. The
questionnaire enabled the researchers to answer ethically relevant questions
about the patient’s case history without needing further interpretation by a
clinician. A case was closed when the patient died or was transferred to
another ward. The documentation questionnaire was filled out in
collaboration with the doctor in charge.
In addition to the detailed case material from the documentation, the paper
used quotes from the so called “table-round”, a daily meeting of all the
clinical staff from the intensive care unit (Meyer-Zehnder, Pargger, &
Reiter-Theil, 2007). This approach offered a unique insight into the
discussions and the decision-making in daily routine regarding the individual
patient on the ward. With the permission of all team members, the
conversations were tape-recorded followed by verbatim transcription and
content analysis (Mayring, 2000). To our knowledge, no publications exist
that describe this kind of “insider perspective” using systematic methods
rather than anecdotal comments. The combination of the clinical-ethical case
series and the analysis of transcripts of the table rounds allowed for
interesting comparisons between what was actually done (case
documentation) and what was discussed (table rounds).
Finally, we used the material to raise and analyze ethical questions and to
develop conclusions. To identify and analyze ethical issues regarding the
involvement of relatives, a conceptual approach to clarify the possible roles
of relatives—i.e., their “authority”—is necessary, especially regarding
expectations, rights, and obligations towards the patient, the involved
clinical staff, and the decision-making process itself. The model utilized here
will be described in the next section.
Theoretical and Conceptual Basis
The structuring and processing of the material relied on several sources of
ethics, law, and guidelines. These reflect the international discourse and the
national specificities of Switzerland (which are similar to other European
countries, especially Germany). Explicit reference was made to respect for
autonomy of the patient as one of the four major principles of health care
ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001), yet not in the form of the explicitly
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articulated wishes of the patient, or of informed consent, as the patients of
our sample were no longer able to formulate preferences due to their medical
condition. We referred to the voices of the relatives as an approach towards
guessing the patient’s “presumed wishes” and studied how this very
common, but standardized objective is practiced. Issues of substitute
decision-making whether formally established or not are also discussed.
Complementary to respect for autonomy and the patient’s wishes, the best
interest standard was considered in case analysis.
Ethical principles and ethics guidelines share the reputation that they do
not present hard and fast criteria, but are soft criteria with sometimes very
lengthy considerations. Nevertheless, ethical guidelines are still considered
to be somewhat more practical than ethical principles, which are often
criticized for being too abstract and remote in practice (Bartels, Parker, &
Hope et al., 2005).
A theoretical analysis of which competences and abilities relatives do or
should have is necessary and of paramount ethical significance. Therefore,
the notion of “authority” will be introduced to provide a concept for
understanding the complex interaction between abilities, exertion of these
abilities, and (moral) rights concerning the involvement of relatives. As
“authority” is often perceived in a pejorative or formal way (Agich, 1995),
the following reflections are necessary to appreciate that this concept may
have further meanings. As Agich explains, the common understanding of
“authority” as “being in authority” often relates to having executive
authority, “one [that] has the right or power to act for or on someone else”
(Agich, 1995). However, this narrow understanding of authority does not
account for more informal kinds of authority that seem to be more relevant
for our topic here. For example, “social role authority” reflects the subtle
social acknowledgement or acceptance of an agent in question, based on the
personal skills that the agent brings to the function of the role (e.g., a
physician, a teacher, a lawyer, or an ethicist) (Agich, 1995). Obviously, this
is not identical with the classical Weberian understanding of “authority” as a
rational or legal type of Herrschaft (power)4 (Weber, 1999), based on formal
laws, i.e., bureaucratic and legitimate use of power, or in the words of
Bochensui (1974), deontic authority, which denotes the capability of
superiors to give orders or instructions to subordinates, e.g., to change
behavior. Neither is a broader understanding of “social role authority”
similar to other ideal types of Weber, such as the charismatic or the
traditional type of Herrschaft, where the mere faith in a hero-like person (or
a “prophet”) or the faith in traditions respectively is sustaining Herrschaft.
The most important difference is that authority does not automatically
signify the executive power or (mis)use of power as suggested by the more
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common understandings of the word. Authority in decision-making has more
subtle and informal character and is similar to social acceptance, trust, and
competence, rather than to executive power. (Yet, competence and
knowledge certainly can produce power-relationships [e.g., Foucault, 1991].)
Accordingly, “authority” here is defined as having a potential, i.e., capability
of a specific type that can be exerted for decision-making; this potential may
have an epistemic nature (knowledge-related) or practical nature. As a
conceptual basis, we suggest a tentative typology of authority describing the
roles that relatives may have or should have in situations where the patient
wishes are not known, but have to be hypothesized or reconstructed.
A Typology of Authority
It may be uncommon to refer to the roles of relatives using the terminology
of “authority”. Especially in end-of-life care, relatives are in an ambiguous
position: often they act as “significant others” of the patient and as an
important resource of support, while at the same time frequently feel
helpless and suffer from grief and loss. In addition, medical complexity may
contribute to the feeling of being overwhelmed and unable to respond
adequately to the demands. Nevertheless, many relatives feel or even claim
that they have a right to be involved and should have a say in what happens
to their severely ill family member. From an ethical perspective, relatives
may not only have the right, but the obligation to be involved and make their
voice heard to the clinicians in the interest of the patient—with or without
the formal authorization of a living will or a court order. They may be
convinced that they have specific knowledge to share and also competence
to evaluate and choose options, which is a view shared by many clinicians.
This can be understood as a role connected to certain kinds of authority,
which will be analyzed in more detail later. How adequately to involve
relatives raises questions and concerns about the do’s and don’ts as well as
about potential misconceptions surrounding the issue.
Three dimensions of authority
We propose a definition of “authority” that covers three dimensions: the
ability to do something, the right to do something, and the involvement in
doing something. Ability regards competence and knowledge as far as it is
related to decision-making (both epistemic and practical);5 the right
addresses the moral and legal claim to be involved in decision-making
(deontic), which falls into the domain of ethical and normative justification.6
Involvement means the actual contribution to decision-making (ontic), which
can be hindered by practical, e.g., procedural or institutional, circumstances.
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In the “ideal” case, all three dimensions of authority are present and no
dimension is under- or overvalued. What we call “incomplete constellations”
are situations where one of the dimensions is under-represented leading to
inconsistencies in the role of the relatives. The interaction of the three
dimensions can be visualized in a three-dimensional graph, where the x, y,
and z axes express degrees of ability, right, and involvement. Likewise,
potential or factual limitations (e.g., legal aspects; see the “right to”-axis) of
one or more dimensions are visualized. Ideally the axes should be balanced,
and should have a sufficiently high degree to be relevant (i.e., the three axes
could be balanced even if all three dimensions have a zero-degree). If one of
the axes is over- or undervalued, this may lead to inconsistencies in the
relatives’ involvement in decision-making.
Types of authority
The following typology of authority is a tentative model.7 It has been
developed in two ways: 1) inductively, on the basis of case material and 2)
deductively, from general philosophical considerations (in reference to the
work of Marcel Mertz).
Authority of Knowledge (AK). Our understanding of authority of
knowledge is similar to what Agich calls epistemic authority: “Epistemic
authority is authority in a field of knowledge, and arises, as a social
institution, from the dual recognition both that we and others have
knowledge and that others have knowledge that we do not have” (Agich,
1995, p. 277). Bochensui also uses the term epistemic authority as the
“authority of the knowing person” whose answers to questions in the field of
expertise are accepted by other persons (Bochensui, 1974). AK has at least
two aspects: knowledge about the patient (patient-related AK) and
knowledge about the medically relevant facts, techniques, and so forth
(medical AK). Here, we are primarily focused on patient-related aspects of
AK. Patent-related AK means that relatives have privileged knowledge, or at
least the capacity to attain it, concerning the beliefs, “world-view” and
presumed wishes of the patient. These become relevant as soon as decisions
are supposed to be justified with reference to the presumed wishes of the
patient who no longer has the faculty of judgment (SAMS, 2005).8 AK
includes the assumption that relatives generally are in the best situation to
express what a patient would wish if he or she was able to communicate his
or her wishes; relatives are considered capable of speaking on behalf of the
patient. This line of argumentation implies that the values and autonomy of
the patient can be promoted through relying on a relative’s voice (Arnold
and Kellum, 2003). However, the degree to which this capability is prevalent
among relatives may differ, although this is a matter of debate.
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To what degree physicians and nurses have patient-related AK is open to
discussion. They may, but ceteris paribus do not generally have a high
degree of patient-related AK regarding wishes relevant for making
treatment-decisions. In EoL care, this depends particularly on their chances
to get to know to the patient before he or she becomes unable to
communicate. They may even have specific AK, if a patient did speak to
them about his or her wishes before losing the faculty of judgment or
consciousness. Conversely, physicians and nurses do have a high degree of
authority of knowledge about medical and nursing care, diagnostic and
treatment measures (medical AK), which is an area of knowledge about
which the relatives usually have limited access.
The ability-dimension of the relatives’ authority of knowledge can be
understood as a cognitive capability. Are the relatives able sufficiently to
understand the medical information? Do they adequately weigh risk and
benefits of a specific treatment? Relatives who do not obtain sufficient
understanding in this area will probably have difficulties exerting other types
of authority in the decision-making process. People who lack the cognitive
or emotional ability to make informed decisions are not regarded as adequate
surrogates for a patient. This is also true from a moral point of view (Arnold
and Kellum, 2003), which corresponds with our notion of the authority of
decision-making. However, the question of whether a decision-maker
possesses the ability and faculty of judgment together with the relevant
knowledge, should not be limited to lay people such as relatives or patients,
but has general relevance to all concerned (SAMS, 2005, pp. 12-13).
Therefore, the authority of knowledge seems to be a very important, if not a
necessary condition for exerting other types authority.
Authority of Good-Life Judgment (AGL). The relative’s authority of
making a judgment about the good life can be understood as an authority of
judgment concerning a patient’s well-being, his or her best interest or, more
philosophically, the authority of making a eudaimonistic judgment (see
Aristotle, 1985). AGL refers to the assumed capability of relatives to
determine what “the best” for the patient would be—not in a medical sense,
but in the sense of a “good life” and a “good dying process”. Attributing this
kind of authority to a relative requires justification: knowing the patient very
well, having privileged insight into his or her recent motivations, being
sufficiently “distanced” to avoid preoccupation by one’s own preferences,
and so forth. This authority refers to “the good” as an extra-moral value,
relevant for and specific to the patient (but possibly with an underlying
general idea of the good, e.g., a shared world-view or religious belief
system). AGL can also be understood in relation to the “best interest”
standard. Relatives may consider themselves privileged to make decisions in
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the (presumed) “best” interest of the patient—an attitude resembling the
paternalistic approach—based on their knowledge about the patient’s values,
or their existing emotional bonds. However, this type of authority may be
misleading in cases where relatives actually lack knowledge about the
authentic values of the patient (Arnold and Kellum, 2003). Finally, AGL can
be understood as determining the objective interest and well-being of the
patient (SAMS, 2005, p. 13).
Authority of Decision-Making (AD). The authority of decision-making
refers to the capability of relatives to make particular treatment decisions on
behalf of the patient or to support the patient in the decision-making process.
This means that relatives are taking on the function of a surrogate (with or
without formal authorization). A special and clearly regulated case is the
decision-making authority of parents regarding treatment of their children.
AD can also be transferred to a physician, although relatives often prefer to
share this authority with physicians (Heyland, Rocker, & O’Callaghan et al.,
2003). The idea of sharing the authority between clinical staff and family is
rather popular in Switzerland (SAMS, 2005).
Whenever relatives wish to share decision-making, physicians should not
reject this approach or delegate AD back to the relatives. Nevertheless, this
may happen through verbal or non-verbal communication and can
unintentionally lead to distress with the relatives, who, especially when
involved in ICU care of a family member, experience high levels of stress in
any case (Pochard, Azoulay, & Chevret et al., 2001). Sharing the authority of
decision-making and taking responsibility for the consequences of the agreed
course of action may be quite burdensome for relatives.
Authority of Procedure (AP). The authority of procedure refers to the
capability of determining the formal and organizational decision rules as
well as the process of decision-making itself. Relatives rarely have AP at the
bedside of a severely ill patient or in a health care institution. They may
share AD or exert some specific aspects of procedural authority, if the
institution and the staff support their participation in the decision-making
process. AP can also be shared with a third-party in addition to the clinical
staff, namely a consultant or a mediator (Agich, 1995). In Europe, ethics
consultation typically is not seen as delegating AD to ethics consultants;
rather, ethics consultants serve those entitled to make decisions as facilitators
with specific knowledge and skills (Reiter-Theil, 2005).
Authority of Action (AA). The authority of action indicates that relatives
can be addressed as people who are capable of relevant actions. They have
intentions, and these intentions are accessible to them—contrary to a patient
who is (temporarily or permanently) incapacitated. Often, the authority of
decision-making and the authority of action coincide. However, if relatives
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are involved as actors, but deprived of the authority of decision-making, i.e.,
are not allowed to decide on behalf of the patient, a divergence occurs. The
two types of authority should be distinguished conceptually because they
may clash in practice. If relatives are understood as members of the unit of
palliative care, authority of action, i.e., being able to do something for the
patient, should never be denied. They must determine how far they feel
capable of getting involved in practical care, be it at the bedside in the caring
institution or at home.
Conceptual confusions between dimensions and types of authority
This approach to describing the roles of relatives in decision-making (DM)
seems to provide a fruitful conceptual and theoretical model. Furthermore,
the approach is also useful as a clinical tool; it identifies common confusions
and conflicts related to the normative, ethical, and practical issues that arise
in the involvement of relatives.
Confusions may occur within all types of authority as well as among the
three dimensions. A specific confusion may prevail if there are doubts about
the authenticity of the relatives’ knowledge concerning the patient’s wishes
and interests (patient-related authority of knowledge), and if those doubts
lead to questioning the right of the relatives to be involved in decision-
making, instead of openly expressing the doubts. Furthermore, the relatives’
capability to determine “the best” for the patient (authority of good-life
judgment) may be confused with their (degree or lack of) understanding of
the clinical facts (medically-related authority of knowledge). This confusion
may be prevalent quite frequently and it may be difficult sufficiently to
distinguish between “the best” in the sense of medical treatment, and “the
best” in the sense of a good life. However, overlap and gray zones between
the two concepts are possible if specific kinds of medical or nursing
interventions are necessary to determine what is “the best” in the
eudaimonistic sense is as it is represented by the relatives.
In these situations, the actual topic is categorized in the wrong “logical
geography” (Ryle, 1965), if instead of using a common-sense language or a
language of philosophy or ethics, a medical language system is applied.
Therefore, it seems worthwhile to identify as precisely as possible what kind
of “function” relatives have in the decision-making process and which types
of authority they are exerting, in addition to how this is perceived by the
clinical staff. We are most interested in looking more deeply into the
question of which requirements may be necessary convincingly to realize the
authority of relatives. A structured discussion and decision-making
procedure that explicitly integrates the question about the roles relatives are
fulfilling or should fulfill would not only contribute to theory, but also help
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in the practical setting. More specifically, legitimate criticism, e.g., about the
relatives’ authority of knowledge, could be distinguished from non-
legitimated doubts that are based on conceptual confusion. This may help to
eliminate ethical problems that derive from non-moral conditions, or at least
make it easier to cope with them. Another legitimate criticism is doubt about
the presumed patient-related authority of knowledge of relatives in the case
where circumstances indicate that the relatives do not have sufficient
knowledge to judge the wishes and preferences of the patient. This includes
the use of earlier statements by the patient in determining the presumed
patient wishes.
In the ethical analysis we distinguish between “first order” and “second
order” ethical problems. A “first order” ethical problem arises out of ethical
reasons, while a “second order” problem is derived from specific triggers or
contexts such as a lack of communication. For example, a conflict between
the duties of respect for autonomy and the obligation to help cannot
exclusively be solved by ideal communication. Even if an ideal discourse
existed, the conflict between the obligations would persist. This situation
thus constitutes a “first order”—or “real”—ethical problem. Real ethical
problems are not limited to situations where the involvement of relatives in
decision-making is neglected or missing. These problems may also arise
when the involvement is ethically sound and, therefore, need to be treated
differently from those which we call “second order” ethical problems. The
latter problems result from stimuli other than ethical reasons, such as
organizational insufficiencies, unpredictability of consequences, or
undesired outcomes of indicated interventions.
Results
This section provides an overview of a systematic case series carried out on
an intensive care unit; the overview includes information about the roles of
the patient’s relatives. Subsequently, we provide an in-depth report of case 3,
and excerpts from the “table rounds” with deliberations on this case. Finally,
the typology of authority will be applied to relevant quotes selected from the
verbatim transcripts of the table rounds.
Case Overview
The case series covers ten ICU patients in whom treatment limitation was
considered, discussed or decided due to unfavorable prognosis. We studied
the criteria and procedural aspects of decision-making regarding the
withholding or withdrawing of treatment. As a result, all ten patients died:
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two of them after being transferred to the ward or to another hospital. None
of the patients were capable of making decisions at the time of the study.
Case 1: A 70-year-old female patient died four days after suffering from a
subarachnoid hemorrhage leading to a massive brain edema. On the second
day, no therapeutic measures were taken because prognosis was judged to be
unfavorable. The relatives were informed regularly and agreed that the dying
process should not be prolonged.
Case 2: A 20-year-old male patient had been involved in a car accident
that caused severe head injuries. He was taken to the central hospital by
helicopter ambulance where an emergency operation was carried out to
remove a subdural hematoma. Despite maximal therapeutic efforts, brain
pressure increased in excess of 80 mm Hg in the hours following the
operation because of the development of a massive brain edema. The
physicians assumed that the patient was already brain dead, so all therapeutic
efforts were stopped and the relatives were informed. The relatives, in
particular the aunt of the patient, suggested the possibility of organ donation.
During the first meeting with the relatives, the physicians in charge
purposely did not respond to this suggestion. Instead, they decided to discuss
it further in the next meeting after brain death diagnostics had been started.
The team perceived the patient’s aunt to be very dominant. The nurse in
charge suggested that the aunt had taken over the mother’s authority and
suggested that the team take that concern into consideration. It first had to be
checked whether the mother really agreed to the organ donation. During
another meeting the relatives agreed to the organ donation although the
patient did not have a donor card. The patient was diagnosed brain dead 48
hours after the accident. The patient donated the heart, liver, pancreas, and
both kidneys.
Case 3: This case will be described in depth in section 4.2.
Case 4: A sprightly 77-year-old male cyclist was run over by a car, which
caused fractures of the 4th and 5th cervical vertebrae leading to quadriplegia.
On day two, the team decided not to treat the patient for aspiration
pneumonia. The relatives played an important role in that decision by
credibly reasoning that living with quadriplegia would not be compatible
with the patient’s presumed wishes. However, the medical team did not fully
agree regarding the degree of the relatives’ involvement. They also discussed
whether the relatives should be allowed to decide if the oxygen content in
the inhalation air should be lowered. Should they be burdened with such a
decision? The patient died on day six following the accident after all
therapeutic measures had been systematically withdrawn.
Case 5: A 70-year-old male patient suddenly complained about severe
stomach pains. In a non-local hospital, a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm
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was diagnosed and the patient was taken to the central hospital immediately
where an emergency operation was undertaken. Due to an occlusion of the
left arteria carotis interna, a hemiparesis at the right side developed after the
operation. It had to be expected that the patient would need permanent care
and be dependent on a wheelchair. In this case, the relatives, thinking of all
possible consequences, asserted that such a life would not correspond to the
presumed wishes of the patient. As in case 4, all life-prolonging therapies
were systematically withdrawn and the patient was transferred back to the
original hospital. He died ten days after the start of the illness.
Case 6: A 35-year-old female patient had been severely injured as a front
seat passenger involved in a car accident. She suffered severe head injuries
and had to be resuscitated at the scene of the accident. The hypoxic brain
damage that subsequently developed was so widespread that the patient was
diagnosed brain dead six days after the accident. This development was
foreseen directly after the accident, and the relatives were informed
immediately that the chances of surviving were small. The patient carried a
donor card and was considered for organ donation after being diagnosed
brain dead. However, because of her past drug usage, her organs were not
taken.
Case 7: An 80-year-old patient suffered from a myocardial infarction with
rupture of the interventricular septum. An emergency operation was carried
out, which was technically very difficult and time consuming. Blood
pressure had to be effectively supported during the whole operation and an
intra-aortic balloon counterpulsation needed to be inserted. Round the clock
cardiovascular support was necessary in the days following the operation on
the intensive care unit and could not be reduced. The patient’s two sons only
wanted to be informed about the course of the illness without getting
involved in the decision-making process. On day 3 after the operation, the
care team was unexpectedly presented with an advance directive, which
stated that the patient did not wish any life-prolonging measures in case of
severe illness. As a result, all cardiovascular support systems were
withdrawn and the patient died shortly thereafter.
Case 8: A 65-year-old female patient suffered from a subarachnoid
hemorrhage after the rupture of a cerebral aneurysm. She was operated on
and started her slow recovery. In the days following the operation, a growing
brain edema developed due to spasms of the brain vessels. As a last resort, a
craniectomy was carried out to increase space for the brain. Her husband
agreed that everything possible should be done to avoid later regret of not
having taken all options. Nevertheless, he was afraid that his wife’s injuries
could result in neurological deficits. Despite the efforts, on day 11 after the
incident she was diagnosed brain dead.
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Case 9: A 71-year-old female patient entered the hospital as an emergency
case because her general condition had severely deteriorated and she had a
fever. A pharyngeal abscess impaired by a mediastinitis was diagnosed, and
she had to undergo surgery on two separate occasions. Subsequently, a septic
shock developed that had to be treated using high doses of norepinephrine.
Due to acute renal failure, continuous hemofiltration therapy was
undertaken. The physicians realized that the patient’s hands and feet
continuously became darker. The increasing ischemia meant that both hands
and forefeet had to be amputated. The relatives, one daughter and the
patient’s partner, were unable to cope with the situation. Although they
contacted the clinical team from time to time, they rarely visited the patient.
Due to the septic shock, the patient needed many infusions which caused an
edema. The relatives found it hard to look at the patient and avoided
conversation with the team. Yet, they were informed on a regular basis of the
patient’s condition, but were not involved in the decision-making process.
The care team decided to withdraw all supporting therapies and to continue
with palliative care. The patient died within several hours on day six after
entering hospital.
Case 10: A 73-year-old patient was electively operated on due to
abdominal aortic aneurysm. A few hours after the operation, the patient
needed to be taken back to the operation theatre due to a thrombosis of one
part of the y-prothesis. After this operation, he woke up very slowly and
physicians realized that he could not move the right side of his body. This
was due to an occlusion of the left arteria carotis interna, which led to severe
ischemia in the brain areas supplied by the vessel. On day 4 after the
operation, the medical team decided not to extend therapy. During the
following days, certain therapies were withdrawn. The relatives suggested
that the patient would not want to live in need of permanent care and
dependent on a wheelchair. They participated in the decision-making and
consented to the withdrawal of the respective therapies. Thirteen days after
the operation, the patient was transferred to the ward, where he died six days
later.
Case 3
A 50-year-old female patient was admitted to the emergency unit in hospital
after an acquaintance stabbed her with a knife in the stomach and the left
hand. The exact progression of events was not known. An operation had to
be carried out due to injuries sustained to the small intestine. The patient was
kept under supervision overnight in the monitoring ward and transferred to
the general ward in the morning. Two days after the operation, the patient
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screwed her eyes during the visit of her husband, gasped for air, and
collapsed unconscious. An emergency team was alerted immediately. The
emergency team intubated the deeply unconscious patient and treated her
low blood pressure. At no point in time had the patient suffered from cardiac
arrest.
After this incident, the patient was treated on the intensive care unit for a
total of 25 days. However, the reason why she lost consciousness could not
be fully explained. Subsequently, acute respiratory distress syndrome
(ARDS) developed, from which the patient died 28 days after being admitted
to hospital. Prior to death, physicians had tried to reach sufficient blood
oxygenation using all forms of treatment available (different forms of
mechanical ventilation, change of body position, steroids, antibiotics, and so
forth). Nevertheless, as bronchopleural fistula continued to develop on both
sides in the lungs, no life-sustaining oxygen saturation could be reached
despite ventilation with 100% of oxygen. Throughout this time, the patient
was fed via gastric tube.
The patient was married and had one daughter. Her brother is a medical
doctor and has a practice with a general practitioner. During the course of
the illness, the relationship between the clinical team and the patient’s
brother became very difficult (see quotes 4, 5, 7 and 8). He asked to be
thoroughly informed about the treatment, in addition to demanding therapy
options, e.g., using steroid therapy (see quotes 5 and 8). Furthermore, he
requested that the patient be treated with Interferon (see quote 2). The
clinical team rejected this because it had not yet been used in such illnesses
and, therefore, would have been purely experimental. The brother continued
to demand that everything possible be done for the patient. Also, he made
blatant accusations against the team several times, most notably for
treatment errors (see quote 5). He requested that his sister be transferred to
another intensive care unit (see quote 5). The request was considered, but the
patient was not in a condition to be transported. The patient’s daughter
suffered immensely because of the situation (see quotes 7 and 8), and the
team advised her to seek help from the crisis intervention department. She
followed the advice and, subsequently, her psychological state seemed to
improve.
Table rounds
In the following section, selected quotes from the table rounds regarding
case 3 are presented to illustrate how the role of the relatives was perceived
by the clinical staff involved. (The table rounds were translated from the
original Swiss German to English literally.) We also use the typology of
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authority and apply it to the involvement of the relatives in this case. *
Application of the typology of authority to the quotes of the table rounds
Quote 1: AA: But I think that it’s not really necessary that they always know
what we’re discussing, but, what we’re discussing here, these are, er, also for
us, foundations for decision-making among the specialists, or, pneumology,
that also know how this develops, or ….
Here, two different aspects of authority of knowledge are involved: one
that should provide a basis for ethical decision making (patient-related AK),
and one that should provide a basis for “technical” decision making
(medical AK). Ethically relevant issues (such as the presumed patient wishes
or the evaluation of the expected consequences of a treatment) are not
reserved for the discourse of the clinical experts alone, but also address those
who are close to the patient, whereas “technical” decision-making relies on
the specific authority of medical knowledge.
Quote 2: AA: So, the intern talked to him [patient’s brother] yesterday
and brought up the thing with the Interferon a little bit and so on. Er, but
then, he didn’t, didn’t really react much to it and he, rather thought, um, that
now it’s time, that we need to talk about therapy withdrawal, actually. And
that he would like to talk to the family ….”
This quote addresses the issues of authority of procedure: the brother
participates in determining the content of the deliberations concerning the
patient, and also to a degree tries to determine the procedure (e.g., that the
question of withdrawing treatment should be discussed with the family first.
However, it is important to note that the brother of the patient is a physician,
who works as a general practitioner. While fulfilling the role of a relative, he
uses his professional background to gain some authority of procedure as
well.
Quote 3: AA: …where the majority of opinion lies with the relatives. On
the one hand, he can say no, that they are against reduction of therapy or at
least in favor of suspending, or they, they want to withdraw. In that case, I
think, we’ve got to think about that, um, or, but it’s like, that we have to
decide that at the end. It can’t be that the relatives decide that in the end.
In this quote, the difference between the wishes of the relatives —or a
type of (doubtful) authority of good life judgment—and the authority of
decision-making is noticeable. At first, the topic is the relatives’ wishes
based on the authority of good life regarding whether a reduction of
treatment might be “the best” for the patient. However, the objection of the
_____________________________________________________________
*Abbreviations from the quotes: AA = attending anesthesia; AS = attending surgery; MD = medical
director; I = intern; N = nurse. Words referring to relatives are italicized.
356 HEC Forum (2007) 19 (4): 341–364.
AA shifts the discussion to the question of who may make decisions about
the actions under discussion (i.e., authority of decision-making).
Quote 4: AA: So, we’ve got, interesting, for the talk, the talk this
afternoon with the relatives, ‘cause they know, her brother maybe knows,
what she [the patient] would have wanted. – AS: That’s what I’m skeptical
about. – N: Me too, has the brother got so much right to determine what’s
going to happen, I can’t …
The assertion of the AA is related to the authority of knowledge of the
relatives, an authority that is questioned thereafter by the AS. The nurse, on
the other hand, formulates doubts about the authority of decision-making or
authority of action on the side of the brother.
Quote 5: AS: …so at the beginning, only the brother came to the
meeting, who, um…then the conversation escalated soon, because in the end
it was not, for the brother, it wasn’t about that like he sticks to the agreement
that we decide what’s going to happen, but then again, after a short time he
started to investigate what allegedly goes wrong here and questioned the
therapy, and then we stopped the meeting, um, and then he replied that he
would make sure that she’ll be transferred to the medical intensive care unit.
… um, shortly after the husband and daughter came, and they obviously
hadn’t been informed enough by the brother what the meeting was really
about and also weren’t fully informed about the, er, how the patient is really
doing.
This quotation makes the problem within the family evident: the brother
assumed for himself the decision-making authority by trying to decide on
behalf of the family, with the husband and the daughter inadequately
informed of the decisions that were the subject matter of the meeting. Lack
of information leads to a decreased ability-dimension for authority of
procedure. It should also be noted that what the patient would want and what
the family may agree about are not necessarily the same.
Quote 6: N: Ah that psyche! If you don’t do anything with her, that’s a
question of feelings, exactly as he said that he’s got the feeling. Those are
his feelings. If you don’t do anything with her, you don’t see anything on
her, do you? They hardly touch her anyway; they’ve got hardly any contact
with her. I tell them, you can touch her, you can talk to her.”
The nurse describes the relatives’ failure to maintain contact with the
patient. This observation addresses a lack of understanding regarding the
medical and existential situation of the patient, i.e., doubts of the ability of
the relatives to contribute to DM.
Quote 7: N: …lately I get the impression that we’re going round in
circles. It’s getting more and more difficult with the relatives, especially
with the daughter, and I realize that she’s at the limit, with that, with the
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situation. And a brother, who keeps phoning in the morning, asks for an
official medical report from us.”
The daughter is at the limits of her ability to participate because of
emotional distress. This makes the whole decision-making process with the
relatives more difficult. On the other hand, the brother is heavily involved in
the process. The way in which the nurse is talking about his attitude suggests
that she doubts his right to the high degree of involvement he requests.
Quote 8: AS: I don’t think that her brother, from what we’ve seen of him
‘til now, if you look at everything, really is the person that thinks and talks in
the interest of his sister. – AA: Yes, that’s exactly why we want to know
what the others think, not the brother, who talks, what the others, the
husband, who now apparently came back to her, for whatever reason, says,
maybe also the daughter, or, I mean she’s really at the limit, what I can also
understand after seeing the mother like that for three weeks, yes.”
Again, the brother of the patient is perceived as a disturbing factor
because the clinical team is not convinced that he represents the interests of
the patient (authority of good-life judgment), nor that he functions as the
spokesman of the family. The other relatives also need to be heard, which is
difficult because of the family situation.
Discussion
The results of the presented case series, the single detailed case analysis, and
transcript analysis illustrate the need for discussion about how relatives
should be involved in EoL decision-making and what can be expected from
their participation. It has also become evident that the need for clarification
covers much more than the question of whether or not a relative has a legal
right to act as a substitute decision-maker. As the case series documents,
formal authorization of relatives (by a court or through the patient in an
advance directive) is very rare in practice. Most relatives act within a gray
zone where their actual rights—or obligations—to speak for the patient and
the adequate way to involve them into EoL decision-making remain open to
interpretation of those involved.
Under the present legal conditions in Switzerland (and also Germany),
relatives who are not authorized as substitute decision-makers should be
invited to contribute their knowledge about the presumed wishes of the
patient, but are not to advocate their own preferences in the case. Legally,
the final judgment and responsibility rest with the physicians: they have to
decide how they will make use of the information provided by the relatives
and which conclusions they draw. But the situation is more complex.
Relatives generally lack education about these issues and have difficulties
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defining their role. General criteria and rules about an adequate procedure
are lacking. As a consequence, there is uncertainty among the clinical staff
about the adequate way to involve relatives; decisions about eventually
limiting treatment at the end-of-life are not considered easy by physicians
and nurses anyway. The uncertainty concerns ability and right to the
decision-making process. Are relatives only providers of patient-related
knowledge, or do they serve to determine what “the best” is for the patient?
Should they be actively involved in the DM process, or even have an
influence on the procedures of EoL decision-making? This uncertainty is not
surprising as the normative-ethical situation is ambiguous. On the one hand,
the present Swiss legal framework is rather restrictive, protecting the
incapacitated patient from interference by third-parties, including
unauthorized relatives. Protection from third-party interests certainly is
justified by the principle of respect for patient autonomy. On the other hand,
strong psychological and moral intuitions indicate that relatives should not
be marginalized in decisions that have an existential meaning for their
beloved-one and themselves; these intuitions are expressed in the draft
version of the Civil Code revision, in which it is planned to give relatives
more weight in EoL decisions concerning a family member. The increasing
recognition of palliative care and the concept of the “Unit of Care” have
strengthened the request that relatives should be adequately involved in
caring for the patient. Appreciation for the relatives and their knowledge
about the patient as a source for EoL decision-making has challenged the
traditional notion of “doctor knows best”, the widely spread opinion that
clinical expertise even covers knowing the presumed patient wishes or
determining the patient’s “good life” or “best interest”. Whereas this motto
will be held valid for clinical judgment, it is not easily accepted “after
paternalism” and after large projects, such as the SUPPORT study, which
showed that doctors are not better at guessing the patient’s presumed wishes
than relatives (SUPPORT, 1995). Given the background of civil rights and
liberal traditions—very much present in Swiss everyday life—decisions of
existential significance, including personal preferences about one’s own
dying process, may not be subject to any expert opinion, not even the
doctor’s. The debate about whether relatives should be given more influence
beyond guessing the presumed patient wishes is ongoing.
This ideal of civil independence must not be confounded with the factual
capability of relatives in a given situation, where they may feel overwhelmed
by the challenge to participate in EoL decision-making and to share
responsibility for the consequences. Therefore, the preliminary
communication about the draft of the Civil Code revision in this regard has
stimulated concern. In our view, a model for orientation is needed to guide
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clinical staff and relatives through the demanding process of critical and
terminal care, and about how to manage participation in decision-making.
Practical ethics is needed to step in between the legal norms and the
psychological or moral intuitions. In a post-paternalistic approach that
respects the rights of the patients, but also appreciates the potential of caring
relatives and their knowledge, the typology of authority presented here
allows for clarification of basic issues and a diagnosis of the “ethical status”
of a given constellation. It is supposed to provide a conceptual framework to
help the clinicians efficiently to view the strengths and weaknesses of the
decision-making process regarding the relatives’ contribution. It should also
help to prevent errors by assessing insufficient distinctions between a)
asking relatives what they know about the patient’s wishes, and b)
stimulating or tolerating that relatives introduce their own preferences
instead—or mix them up. The brief and fast approach of diagnosing the
ethical status may also remind clinical staff that relatives should be involved
in an adequate way. By relying on the authority of knowledge in the
conversation with relatives explicitly, both sides can rely on a transparent,
reasonable, not only subjective, criterion of what should be considered
necessary in the DM process, i.e., authentic insight into the patient’s
preferences and values. The gain of this approach will hopefully be twofold:
1) to safeguard that the DM process and the patient benefit from the
knowledge of relatives, and 2) that the relatives—who are in an emotionally
demanding situation—are not overwhelmed by diffuse or heavy
responsibilities that they cannot and should not bear. As a result, the
transparent approach would also help clinicians to handle the involvement of
relatives, which sometimes creates more challenges than the clinical
management itself.
Conclusion
Patients, family, and clinical staff need to be educated about the complex
and often ambiguous situation that relatives of incapacitated patients should
be involved in DM. It seems evident that this should happen in an ethically
informed manner. The typology of authority regarding the relatives’ roles is
suggested as a practical tool for diagnosing the “ethical status” of their
participation in a certain decision-making process and analyzing “incomplete
constellations” that require modification. In summary, the present legal
framework, moral intuitions, and clinical routine are not congruent—the first
is regarded as too restrictive towards unauthorized relatives (see the revision
project), the second (relatives should have a say in existential issues) may
overstretch the competence of relatives, and the third, clinical practice, is
360 HEC Forum (2007) 19 (4): 341–364.
oscillating between the two poles. The reform of the Civil Code will be
underway for several years to come, and it is still unclear to where exactly it
will lead. In this period of transition, ethical guidelines and tools seem to
offer the best approach towards some general orientation for individualized
case management.
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NOTES
1 “Those who are the focus of a plan of care. In hospice palliative care this
is typically the patient and his/her family”. Center to Advanced Palliative
Care (2006): http://64.85.16.230/ educate/ content/ elements/ lexicon/
unitofcare.html
2 Different legal situations in the different countries were considered.
3 Vorentwurf für eine Revision des Zivilgesetzbuches, 25.6.2003,
Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Bern. (Draft, Revision of
Civil Code, 06-25-2003, Federal Department of Justice and Police,
Berne).
4 Herrschaft defined as “die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts
bei angebbaren Personen Gehorsam zu finden” (translation (SRT): the
chance that certain persons will obey a specific order).
5 Cognitive-subjective abilities such as power or faculty of judgment and
level of (relevant) knowledge are included.
6 The normative question which type of authority relatives should have is
discussed in: Mertz M. Rolle und Funktion von Angehörigen in kritischen
Entscheidungen am Lebensende. Ein Beitrag zur Modellentwicklung auf
der Basis einer begrifflichen Problemanalyse. Einsendearbeit
Nachwuchspreis Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin, 2005.
7 The typology is suggested for the sake of conceptual order, but does not
yet imply that relatives actually have or should have such authority.
Possible ethical justifications will be discussed later.
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8 The cited literature does not use the same concepts of authority we
propose here.
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